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During the heyday of the Washington Consensus and the widespread implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) in developing countries, the World Bank and the IMF 
sought legitimacy via their role in creating economic growth. SAPs were radical austerity 
policies meant to privatize government departments and liberalize markets and to boost GDP in 
debtor nations dramatically. However, when that growth failed to appear, and the most 
vulnerable people in those nations were faced with the negative externalities of SAPs, the Bank 
and the Fund were faced with a crisis of legitimacy. Therefore, rather than continuing to use the 
goal of GDP growth as a source of legitimacy, the Bank and the Fund began to frame their 
policies in terms of poverty eradication: a normative value which was not tied to a final result the 
way promoting GDP growth had been. In this paper, I will argue that, because of the problems 
IFIs faced legitimizing their policies following SAPs, there was a switch within these institutions 
from legitimation based on results to legitimation based on norms.  
In order to show that this shift in legitimation strategy occurred, I will highlight the gap in the 
literature that exists between studies of legitimacy of global governance institutions like the 
Bretton Woods institutions, and studies of gendered, or feminist, International Political Economy 
(IPE). Literature on legitimacy to date has addressed international financial institutions in 
various contexts, but has never directly addressed the other power systems or dynamics that 
operate at the same time as global policy, including patriarchy, neocolonialism-neoimperialism, 
and racism. In contrast, Gendered IPE is centrally concerned with critical analysis of power 
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structures. International Financial Institutions have been the topic of Gendered IPE to the extent 
that certain policies have furthered the manifestation of oppressive power structures, but there 
has been no writing from Gendered IPE that takes on IFIs from the point of view of legitimacy 
theory.  
In this chapter, I will begin with an introduction to legitimacy theory scholarship in the 
context of global governance and go on to establish the problem of legitimacy that the Bretton 
Woods institutions faced following the implementation of SAPs. I will then focus on Gendered 
IPE: first on the previous Gendered IPE scholarship on international financial institutions, then 
on the relationship of Gendered IPE to legitimacy theory, including the some of the methodology 
that Gendered IPE uses to highlight different conceptions of power. Finally, I will introduce the 
two case studies I will examine as examples of this shift in legitimation strategy.   
Bringing together these two bodies of literature, although they should be complementary, 
shows that there is both a conceptual gap: the problem of legitimacy is not fully understood, and 
an empirical gap: the change from SAPs to PRSPs needs to be more fully investigated as a 
change in legitimation strategies by the Bretton Woods institutions. By combining previous 
studies of legitimacy of international financial institutions with awareness of critical power 
structures like gender, the legitimacy question can be much better understood.  
 
Legitimacy theory as a framework for analysis 
 
How to define legitimacy? 
 
Legitimacy is a perennial question in politics at every level, from the local to the 
international. Because of the universality of the question, legitimacy literature exists on every 
level: from local politics to global governance. For this argument, I will generally focus on 
definitions of legitimacy that have already been applied in the context of global governance.  
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There are two main issues to keep in mind while negotiating literature on legitimacy 
theory. The first is that legitimacy is defined in myriad different ways, sometimes by the same 
author. The second issue is the main concern of this paper: that legitimacy theory, to date, has 
not included enough awareness of ‘unspoken’ power structures such as gender, race, or 
postcolonialism in order to conduct a thorough analysis. In this chapter, I’ll be placing some key 
works from gendered IPE in dialog with legitimacy theory in order to show how fruitful the 
combination of the two can be.  
Returning to definitions: there is significant variation in how legitimacy is defined 
throughout the literature on the subject. Some of the most authoritative writing on legitimacy in 
global governance comes from Jens Steffek (2003), who describes legitimacy in international 
governance organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
For the purpose of this paper, I’ll be using the definition of legitimacy that Steffek (2003) 
quotes from David Beetham (1991: Ch 1) of ‘Descriptive Legitimacy’ (5). Descriptive 
legitimacy “tells us why the subjects to that governance accept and support it in reality” (Steffek, 
253).  This definition is useful for this analysis because it still allows for further discussion of 
mechanisms of legitimation: how institutions make themselves legitimate. 
Other definitions of legitimacy, like prescriptive legitimacy (also cited by Steffek: 2003, 
253) cannot be used for this analysis because prescriptive legitimacy is inherently concerned 
with whether an organization has met the theoretical conditions that should allow it to be 
described as legitimate. Descriptive legitimacy exists when the actions of an international 
organization are accepted as legitimate in reality. Descriptive legitimacy, therefore, tells us much 
more about the strategies being employed by the governance institution, and whether or not those 





Mechanisms of legitimation 
 
Underneath the question of ‘what is legitimacy’ is ‘what makes a policy or institution 
legitimate?’ An analysis of the legitimation strategy of international financial institutions has to 
be cognizant of both what legitimacy is, but also what practices work to make that legitimacy 
happen. These are ‘mechanisms of legitimation’ and different conceptions of legitimacy feature 
different visions of legitimation mechanisms and strategies.  
The mechanism that Steffek (2003) says is responsible for achieving legitimacy is the 
discourse approach to legitimacy, defined as the legitimation of governance as a result of 
rational deliberation and discussion (263).  
Steffek’s ideas on legitimacy are similar to those of Williams (2006), who distinguishes 
between moral and performance legitimacy rather than prescriptive and descriptive. The 
difference between the two can be broken down into means versus ends, or intentions versus 
results. Performance legitimacy is the idea that governance is legitimated by its success; the ends 
it achieves; the results that it can register. Moral legitimacy looks to legitimate organizations by 
considering their normative commitments, the means they use, and their intentions. 
Williams’ definitions of legitimacies, although not originally applied to global 
governance, capture two important, and different, outlooks for international financial institutions. 
Performance legitimacy represents the Washington Consensus-era idea that GDP growth alone in 
developing countries made IMF and the Bank legitimate. Moral legitimacy captures the more 
recent shift from the primacy of the Washington Consensus to the era of Poverty Alleviation—
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the idea that IFIs could be legitimated solely by their normative or moral commitments, as 
opposed to how successfully they achieved their goals. 
This idea brings Williams into agreement with Steffek, who writes that international 
legitimacy is also defined by the scope and limits of international governance. “International 
governance can only be perceived as legitimate if states agree that certain values should, or can 
only, be realized on an international level.” (266). Therefore, if the values that IFIs were 
pursuing in austerity-based plans (SAPs, PRSPs) were not agreed-upon international norms, IFIs 
may have been going beyond their international mandate in implementing those policies. 
Alison Van Rooy (2004) offers a set of rules by which civil society organizations (CSOs) 
can gain legitimacy in the international sphere, and refers to these rules or standards as parts of a 
“legitimacy game.” IFIs are also, unquestionably, participants in a global legitimacy game: 
continuously attempting to validate their own operations. Using some of the metrics Van Rooy 
uses to measure the legitimacy of civil society organizations can also be helpful in examining 
IFIs.  
With that said, Van Rooy specifies theses metrics for organizations that are acting in 
protest of a system put in place, in part, by IFIs, so the rules that contribute to the legitimacy of 
CSOs do not map onto international governance institutions or international financial institutions 
directly. However, some of the ways that Van Rooy describes CSOs playing the legitimacy game 
also apply to IFIs. Like CSOs, IFIs are also complex organizations with a policy agenda, and that 
means many of the ‘rules’ Van Rooy describes carry over.  
Van Rooy writes that organizations can gain legitimacy through factors including their 
internal democracy, specifically the membership’s choice of leadership (70), the membership’s 
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democratic control over their leadership (71), the accountability that leaders have to their 
constituents (72), and the relative transparency of the organizations (74). 
Van Rooy also acknowledges that CSOs can gain legitimacy by working as experts 
within their field: supplying rare, reliable information (81), acting as credible sources (88), 
working as disciplinarians within their field (83), and providers of balanced, reasonable 
information (91). This can be benign, such as the World Bank providing data on development to 
national governments who otherwise might not have the means to conduct large-scale studies. 
Alternatively, the idea of International Financial Institutions acting as disciplinarians within the 
field of international regulation can be linked to Stephen Gill’s idea of disciplinary 
neoliberalism: the idea that, in a neoliberal economy, those institutions willing to impose 
austerity measures gain a legitimacy of fearlessness: right or wrong in their policy, they will take 
strong actions.  
Like Steffek and Williams, Van Rooy argues that institutions can also be legitimated by 
their moral authority: if they are seen to be acting in the public interest (95), promoting a 
common standard of behavior (97), and presenting moral views in line with other international 
actors (98). Van Rooy offers a handful of ways for organizations to bolster their legitimacy: 
some clearly ‘performative’ (acting as experts, providing information), and some ‘moral’ (acting 
in the public interest, reinforcing international norms).  Both moral and performance legitimacies 
have important roles in the history of international financial institutions. However, the 
mechanisms of legitimation presented by Steffek, Williams, and Van Rooy all overlook 
considerations such as gender and race, which play a significant role in how the legitimation 
strategy of these organizations plays out in reality.  
 
Significance of performance legitimacy 
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Performance legitimacy is closely correlated with the set of ideologies that dominated the 
Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the IMF, during the 1980s. Williams’ ideas of 
performance legitimacy, the idea that organizations are made legitimate by the achievement of 
their goals, closely mirrors the actions of the World Bank and the IMF in implementing SAPs: 
SAPs were deemed legitimate because they were able to produce GDP growth. When they failed 
to produce the growth they promised, their legitimacy fell into question.  
The link between performance legitimacy and neo-liberalism holds up on closer examination 
of the theory. Although Rachel Turner (2008), in her study of neo-liberal ideology, notes that 
there are multiple different varieties of ‘neo-liberalisms’ at play at any given time, Turner 
concedes that study of the World Bank and the IMF reveals a significant neo-liberal ideological 
foundation. Specifically, Turner points to two important guiding institutional principles: 
deferring to the market order, and minimizing regulation or bureaucracy that might interfere with 
the free market (116). The rhetoric of ‘the free market knows best’ ties directly into results-
driven, performance legitimacy. The assumption of neo-liberal philosophy is that the value of 
policy will be shown by a positive response from the markets.  
With that said, Turner notes that much of the top-down policy planning that is inherent in 
IFIs would actually be antithetical to pure neo-liberals, who would prefer true laissez-faire (135). 
Turner writes that a neo-liberal purist would immediately notice a divergence between IFIs free-
market rhetoric and their policy (135). The importance of rhetoric to legitimate action is then 
important: why would these institutions employ free-market rhetoric if it did not help legitimate 
their policy? Therefore, when the free-market rhetoric failed to align with the market growth it 
promised (performance legitimacy), the institutional language changed to use normative 
justifications.  
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After SAPs failed to produce the GDP growth they were expected to and IFIs legitimacy 
suffered for it, the World Bank and IMF did not try to make PRSPs legitimate the same way. 
PRSPs would not be legitimate because they were   producing GDP growth, they would be 
legitimate because they were reducing poverty: because they were doing good. This shift in 
legitimation represents a shift from the brand of performance legitimacy that Williams described 
to a moral legitimacy. PRSPs were not to be seen as legitimate because of their ends, but because 
of their moral intent. Essentially, when performance legitimacy failed to materialize for SAPs, 
IFIs changed the “legitimacy game” (Van Rooy, 103) that they were playing, and switched the 
focus to a broader poverty-reduction agenda.  
 
Significance of moral legitimacy   
 
The Bretton Woods institutions’ shift to PRSPs indicates a shift to moral legitimacy: 
letting policies be legitimated by international norms rather than their performance. Aside from 
possibly representing a change in economic strategy for IFIs, moral legitimacy has significant 
context outside development policy. The World Bank and the IMF can be seen as late adopters 
of moral legitimacy, which has historically been used in the context of international law and 
human rights, where quantifiable results are hard to achieve.  
An important milestone in the evolution of norms around poverty is the increased 
understanding that living in poverty alone can constitute a violation of human rights (NcNeill 
and St. Clair, 50). Changing norms that understand poverty not just as a lack of capital, but as an 
inability to fulfill the entirety of one’s human potential (“capacity poverty”) did not exist in 
isolation from the increasing incorporation of poverty alleviation into the agenda of IFIs.  The 
shift from legitimation-by-performance in SAPs to legitimation-by-morals is also important from 
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a normative standpoint. Primarily, it indicates that norms may be more powerful than originally 
expected in international political economy.  
 
A problem of legitimacy: The Bretton Woods institutions post-SAPs 
 
Let’s return to the specific case at the center of this argument—Bretton Woods institutions in 
between the introduction of SAPs and PRSPs—in order to test those definitions. In order to show 
that there was a change in legitimation strategy in response to a problem of legitimacy, it is first 
necessary to show that there was a problem of legitimacy. After SAPs were implemented and 
failed to meet expectations for GDP growth, they failed the test of performance legitimacy. Their 
legitimacy was expected to come from their results, but those results never materialized. When 
GDPs of developing nations failed to grow, the Bretton Woods institutions were faced with the 
start of a legitimacy crisis. This was not a case of normative/moral legitimacy because, although 
the virtues of market liberalization and privatization (part of the set of norms that falls broadly 
under laissez-faire individualism) were definitely extolled in the rhetoric surrounding SAPs, they 
were not the central justification for the policy: just like SAPs, market liberalization and 
privatization were only good because they led to growth.  
To describe the actors involved in the legitimacy crisis more thoroughly: there were two 
major detractors of these international organizations who can loosely be sorted into insiders and 
outsiders. Insiders being economists, those in business, those controlling the inner workings of 
global trade. Outsiders were those in civil society organizations, particularly those affiliated with 
feminist causes: those on the opposite end of the power dynamic. The first truly resonant critique 
of the Washington Consensus—in particular, of Structural Adjustment—came from Richard 
Jolly, in “Adjustment with a Human Face,” a work in which he managed to take “outsider” 
criticisms and relay them in “insider” language. Jolly’s main argument—the one for which the 
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book is still known today—is that the human cost of Structural Adjustment was too high. Those 
who were forced to make sacrifices when governments underwent those sharp cuts and austerity 
policies were often women and children, vulnerable to begin with, not advantaged persons in 
society who could ‘afford’ to make sacrifices for the greater good.  
In many ways, “Adjustment with a Human Face” sets the scene—better than any other 
scholarly work might—for the remediation of legitimacy theory and gendered IPE. Jolly was 
writing his critique of Structural Adjustment in the language of Bretton Woods economists at the 
time (in the words of Gendered IPE, in the language/discourse of power) but was bringing in 
arguments that would have fit into Gendered IPE scholarship. 
 
Understanding power differently: Linking legitimacy theory and gendered international 
political economy 
 
Gendered IPE and International Financial Institutions  
 
Although Gendered IPE has never been put into direct conversation with legitimacy 
theory of the type Steffek and Williams describe, scholars of Gendered IPE have not hesitated to 
publish on the subject of Bretton Woods institutions; primarily focusing on the negative 
externalities of Structural Adjustment. Woods (2012), Benería (2003), and Barker and Feiner 
(2004) all discuss how race, gender, economic, and geographic inequality have compounded to 
contest the legitimacy of IFIs during the SAP-PRSP years. However, no studies exist that 
compare IFI’s strategies to promote their own legitimacy during the implementation of SAPs 
with their legitimation strategy during PRSPs. The shift that happened between the two, from 
performance legitimacy to moral legitimacy, is significant, and whether the shift was accepted by 
the countries the Bank and the IMF were working with is also important and unstudied.  
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IFIs became a target for critique by scholars of Gendered IPE after the inequality with which 
SAPs affected women in the developing world. In order to understand the differential effect of 
adjustment on women, it’s important to understand SAPs as originally constructed as gender-
blind, and the models designed to understand them also having been constructed as gender-blind 
(Elson, 1992). However, “structural adjustment required government spending cutbacks on 
health, education, and other social services. As public provisioning was reduced, families had to 
provide these services themselves or go without them altogether. Costs were shifted from the 
monetized public sector to the nonmonetized household sector. Policymakers assumed that there 
was an unlimited supply of women’s labor available to compensate for the reduction in public 
social services. Since the value of household labor is not officially counted, these costs were 
hidden” (Barker and Feiner, 2007, 107). 
Lourdes Benería (2004), in her work on gender and development, makes three conclusions 
based on a feminist reading of macroeconomic policy (50). Like Barker and Feiner, Benería 
notes that that SAPs assume that there is infinite capacity in the nonmonetized household sector 
that can absorb any public sector losses. In that line, Benería notes that SAPs ignore—do not 
mention—unpaid, reproductive, social and emotional labor, because that labor is traditionally not 
monetized. This household labor is traditionally ‘women’s work,’ and decisions to shift the 
burden to that sector place a burden disproportionately on women. Because of this, Benería 
makes the third conclusion, that SAPs are not gender-neutral. Rather, they put the burden of 
development, growth, or—in the case of PRSPs—poverty alleviation—squarely on women.  
Khadjia Ali observed this gendered impact in the shift from SAPs to PRSPs. In her multi-
country survey of the transition from SAPs to PRSPs, Ali notes that “the social impacts of the 
policy measures have rarely been taken into account” and that “hardly any attempt has been 
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made to link micro units of the economies, particularly households, with their macro framework” 
(672). Rather, the policy focus in both SAPs and PRSPs, Ali notes, has been on a “pure 
macroeconomic agenda” (672). Ali observes this doctrinal adherence to neoclassical economics 
is a missed opportunity: PRSPs, given their more collaborative structure, might have been an 
opportunity to integrate ethics of care into development policy.  
Fiona Robinson, in her essay “Feminist Ethics and Global Security Governance,” 
incorporates ethics of care in global governance context. Ethics of care is a critical analysis of 
power that focuses on a re-incorporation of the idea of “care—as a social and moral practice—
[as] fundamental part of human life.” (Robinson, 107). This reincorporation compensates for the 
fact that care work—“women’s work’—has traditionally been ignored by cohorts of male 
economists and policymakers. When household labor, or care work, is not monetized in SAPs, it 
is not valued. This is fundamentally related to one of the original assumptions of neoliberalism: 
that if the market does not naturally allocate value to a good or service, that it is valueless. 
SAPs—and PRSPs—failed to integrate or recognize care work almost entirely. Incorporating 
that failure into an analysis of their legitimacy is essential to better understanding the response 
these policies actually received.  
Additionally, Robinson describes feminist ethics as a search for a critical conception of 
power, which “eschews the tendency of traditional moral theory to shunt to the bottom of the 
agenda relationships between those who are clearly unequal in power—including parents and 
children, and large states and small states” (106). When could it be better to conceive power 
critically than in a study of legitimacy? The main body of scholarship on legitimacy theory has 
adopted traditional conceptions of power. However, when considering the legitimacy of IFIs 
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implementing development policies in two postcolonial nations, a critical conception of power 
offers a lens with which to view issues of gender, race, and postcolonial inequality.  
Robinson also describes the role of human security in the context of feminist ethics; 
another component that traditional writing on legitimacy theory misses. Human security has 
traditionally been read as a gender-blind concern with “human life and dignity.” In order to add a 
gendered nature to our idea of human security, a critical step is considering human security in 
context. This could include, for example, the context that exists before, during, and after the 
intervention of an IFI. Robinson notes that inability to observe these relationships over time is 
one of the main problems with ‘government by crisis’ that has taken place beginning in the 
1980s. 
When an IFI intervenes to implement a gender-blind SAP or a flawed PRSP, they are 
only intervening in response to the crisis, and ignore the context: “This background exists before, 
during, and after the conflict, and is played out not by isolated individuals seeking to claim their 
rights, but in relationships of responsibility—in households, refugee camps, factories, hospitals, 
chronic care facilities, community meetings, schools, and daycares” (105). When IFIs only 
intervene in crisis situations, they adopt a license to focus ‘only on economic ills’ and relegate 
interpersonal relationships—care relationships—to the status of addenda. This outlook is linked 
to a central component of growth-oriented development strategy that allows for the cuts in public 
services: Robinson describes an “ontology of individualism” that ignores the reality that 
nonmonetized care labor will take the place of state welfare in an austerity situation. This 
unquestionably affects how the people most affected by a SAP or PRSP perceive its legitimacy. 
Using a gendered IPE lens that includes insights from feminist ethics and ethics of care offers 
views on legitimacy that are left out of an analysis that fails to problematize the idea of ‘power.’   
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Legitimacy under alternative power structures  
 
Previous studies of legitimacy of international financial institutions, like those by Steffek, or 
other works using legitimacy frameworks, like Williams, have not taken into account critical 
power structures like gender. There is no tradition of linking either the concept of legitimacy to 
critical power structures, or an empirical body of scholarship investigating the change in 
legitimation strategy by the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Gendered International Political Economy, like what is written about by Benería, Barker 
and Feiner, is centrally focused on illuminating the operative power dynamics that motivate 
policy decisions. These power dynamics can come from structures of patriarchy, or from race, 
post-colonial tension, or economic disparity. Regardless, the critical interrogation of the 
operative power structures at work in the adjustment process is necessary in order to properly 
contextualize these policies.  
It is important to bring a gender lens to understanding legitimacy theory, first and foremost, 
because descriptive legitimacy is closely linked to domination, an idea Steffek traces from its 
original definition in Weber (251).  Gendered international political economy is focused on 
identifying systems of power (and domination) and understanding the role they play in policy 
outcomes like legitimation.  
Weber, cited by Steffek, defines domination— “herrschaft”—as “the probability that a 
command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” The idea of 
“domination” can quickly become complicated when one imagines a nation where the ruling 
elite (a nation with any degree of oligarchic rule) assents to rules set by international governance 
organizations, regardless of the dissent of a marginalized underclass or civil society. Domination, 
then, exists, but can the consent of the few in power be read as descriptive legitimacy? This 
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related to the problem Steffek raises of compliance versus acceptance in legitimacy literature: 
just because a state complies with the regulations set by an IFI (perhaps out of economic 
necessity, or to protect themselves from a greater threat), does not mean that they accept that 
organization, or even the entirety of the regulation in question. 
A gender lens is not only useful in considering the problems inherent in SAPs, but is also 
useful in understanding the legitimacy problems of IFIs related to SAPs. In returning to Steffek’s 
idea of descriptive legitimacy, which comes from Weber’s idea of “domination” or “herrschaft,” 
it’s easier to see some of the immediate connotations of ideas of legitimacy. There’s a natural 
connection between Weber’s herrschaft domination and gender analysis: “herrschaft” comes 
from Middle-High German, originally from the word “herr” (meaning, Mister), meaning legal 
purview or property of a gentleman. The word domination, for Weber, has built into it ideas of 
who domination is meant involve or apply to. Although the analysis of the word “herrschaft” 
may seem abstruse, considering its origin is part of the critical reading of power necessitated by 
feminist ethics of global governance. If the only legitimate structures of international or global 
governance come from a patriarchal lineage, that power dynamic merits scrutiny—does that 
history affect its legitimacy?  
Benería also raises the “TINA problem” that comes up when discussing the legitimacy of n 
solutions like SAPs: narrowly considered economic decision-making perpetuates the idea that 
there is no alternative (T-I-N-A) to neoliberal choices. Even though issues like gender have 
confronted the policymakers designing SAPs/PRSPs, Benería writes that this dissent—along 
with the dissolution of the Washington Consensus— “has led to the search for alternatives, so far 
not necessarily representing a radical shift but rather a higher degree of attention paid to poverty 
alleviation (rather than eradication) and to social policies” (53).  
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Bringing in a gender lens is in many ways a solution to the TINA problem: Gendered IPE is 
quick to also bring back politics of care and introduce different values into macroeconomic 
decision-making (Robinson 106). Although Van Rooy discusses how the dynamics of legitimacy 
affect CSOs, there are many other dynamics operating underneath the overarching frameworks 
of “legitimacy” that are not problematized in writing like Steffek’s.  
 
The social investment perspective 
 
The change in legitimation strategy, rather than a change in policy, is particularly observable 
through the use of the “social investment perspective” in PRSPs. Rather than that movement 
towards gender equality, an increased integration of politics of care, or even a holistic view of 
human development, development under PRSPs co-opted the language of poverty eradication to 
accomplish market liberalization and development of capital. Reducing poverty and allocating 
money towards health, education, or gender empowerment is done exclusively through the 
language of “investment” and “return on investment.” Both Megan MacKenzie and Jane Jenson 
write about how language from development policy or poverty eradication gets re-used in order 
to talk about people in the language of money. Yes, approaching poverty reduction from the 
point of view of social investment does make some absolute gains in terms of reducing poverty, 
but does so in a way that still sees economic growth as the sole means of empowering the poor. 
 Jane Jenson describes how the “social investment” perspective is “replacing” the language 
of previous growth-oriented development policies, in a turn of phrase that views human capital 
development as an investment, as opposed to seeing economic growth as impersonal. The social 
investment perspective takes the focus off adult women and places it on young girls (the better 
investment)—in food subsidies, or early education, which will have a longer-term payoff than on 
their mothers. Although the social investment perspective seems more outwardly benign than an 
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impersonal approach, Jenson warns that monetizing issues blinds us to the underlying problems. 
In particular, the social investment perspective misses “the structural factors that cause women, 
their work, and their achievements to be devalued and undervalued with respect to men’s” in the 
first place (466).  
MacKenzie centers her analysis on the term “empowerment,” noting that the post-conflict 
empowerment initiatives she observes are only ways to draw women back into the formal 
economy. Women are not “empowered” unless they have taken a traditionally female-gendered 
job—often gara tie-dying, soap-making, tailoring, catering, hairdressing, or weaving. These 
occupations were chosen to be offered to female ex-combatants as part of a UN disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program despite the fact that there was already a 
surplus of people in these occupations already, and these occupations were not highly lucrative. 
Similarly, empowerment “micro-credit” regimes were explicitly intended to help women support 
families, “in order to reduce such pressures on male combatants” (212).  
 




I plan to take a historical approach to my analysis of the shift in how IFIs legitimate 
themselves. In order to see these mechanisms of legitimation clearly, I will investigate two cases 
where both SAPs and PRSPs were put in place by the IMF and World Bank. This will allow me 
to see the change in legitimation strategy over time. Exploratory case studies are the best way to 
proceed in conducting research on this change in legitimacy: there are few case studies in the 
literature now, particularly those that concentrate on critical power structures like gender.  
The two cases I intend to focus on are Bolivia and Zambia. The process of choosing these 
cases is as follows. First, I had to select countries that had been through both an SAP and a 
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PRSP. I wanted to select one case from Africa and one from Latin America in order to look at 
legitimacy at the two major sites of IFI intervention. I wanted to choose countries that had 
roughly similar experiences during the SAP and PRSP process, particularly regarding changes in 
their GDP. If one country had experienced extreme growth and the other had not, it would have 
been more difficult to compare the legitimation strategies—it would have been possible that the 
change in GDP could have been the variable responsible for a divergent legitimation strategy, or 
there may not have been an observable change in legitimation at all.  
I used data from the World Bank’s DataBank in order to compare the GDPs of possible case 
studies. Figures 1.1 to 1.5 demonstrate that the trends in GDP per capita (1.1), overall GDP (1.2), 
GDP per capita growth (1.3), GDP growth by % (1.4), and natural resources rents (1.5) are 
similar enough to be able to compare in a case study. Further, both countries are developing 
countries in the global South. Both countries are primarily commodity exporters (Bolivia: coca 
and minerals, Zambia, copper). The trends in the GDPs of Bolivia and Zambia are similar 
enough to make them useful to compare. There are both important similarities and differences 
between the two cases that make them useful for understanding this historical problem.  
There are some observable, but not significant differences between the case studies. Figure 
1.6 shows the trend in inflation, with a large spike in Bolivia’s inflation. This reflects a period of 
hyperinflation in Bolivia between 1978 and 1982 due to both the collapse of mineral export 
prices and to the external debt crisis and political instability…when a series of coups and 
presidential elections occurred (Wanderley, 2009, 255). Although the experience of 
hyperinflation is unique to Bolivia rather than shared between both Bolivia and Zambia. 
However, Zambia also experienced inflation in 1991: the problem of inflation, experienced 
generally, is common to both cases, rather than unique. Finally, Figure 1.7 shows a comparative 
 22 
Graph of the GDPs of Bolivia, Zambia, and Honduras. Honduras was another candidate for the 
Latin American case study. However, because Zambia’s experience with both SAPs and PRSPs 




Bolivia, having been through both a SAP and a PRSP, has been used as a proving ground 
for development policy since 1985, with Bolivia’s first SAP. Benjamin Kohl describes how this 
pattern continued throughout the 1990s, with Bolivia’s 1993 Plan de Todos later being adapted 
for use in Central America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa (451). Therefore, while policy 
written in Bolivia has a specific context, it also has global implications: as a first adopter, Bolivia 
was often the first to experience the consequences of a neoliberal wave of policy. Furthermore, 
Kohl writes, while the policies of pushing for growth and privatizing state institutions adopted in 
Bolivia were adopted in context, “the push to provide stable environments for international firms 
while concurrently decentralizing governmental powers is in vogue around the globe” (452). The 
incentive to create a business-friendly environment that also minimizes the power of the national 
government and welfare state is near-universal in development policy, and thus worth 
examining.  
Furthermore, Bolivia has a telling history of popular participation in development policy, 
with a strong culture of community organization at the local and national level. Miguel Urioste 
Fernandez de Cordova describes the relationship between civil society and government, which 
was solidified by Bolivia’s Popular Participation Act, aimed at institutionalizing citizens’ rights 
at the local level (1). Organizations have emerged in Bolivia along axes of economic class, 
indigenous identity, as well as cause and protest (11). Local NGOs have also taken on a 
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significant share of the work of public institutions, and employ thousands of middle class 




Neo Simutanyi writes that Zambia adopted a structural adjustment program in 1983, 
which was a significant shift from previous attempts at market reforms, and was done primarily 
so that Zambia could receive external financing from the IMF and the World Bank (826).  
Zambia is also particularly notable as a mineral exporting economy that is highly subject 
to booms and busts as demand for mined goods, in this case, copper, fluctuate. Philip Daniel 
writes on the impact of adjustment on the Zambian economy and notes that the significant 
“downward spiral” that the Zambian economy suffered during the period before the institution of 
the SAP. The vulnerability of the mineral exporting economy, combined with the effects of oil 
price increases and the consequences of the Zimbabwean conflict (1965-1979) left the Zambian 
economy in poor shape. This created an environment that was more politically vulnerable to 
accepting particularly harsh adjustment conditions when it came to sign onto their SAP in 1983.  
Sumutanyi describes the civil society response to these harsh adjustment policies: they 
were generally unpopular, and discontent with an economic agenda that did not value social 
services became closely linked to a push for greater democratization in government (829). 
However, the Zambian business class became newly politically active during the 1970s and 
1980s and became significant proponents of adjustment: they saw their enterprises succeed as 










During the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1985), Bolivia’s adoption of Structural 
Adjustment, state capitalism was abandoned, and the private sector was given primary 
responsibility for economic growth (Wanderley, 2009, 256). The NEP was the first major 
international economic reform in Latin America in 1980 (Van Dijk, 1999, 1). The NEP, Bolivia’s 
iteration of Structural Adjustment, was its attempt to restate the Washington Consensus for its 
own use. However, the Washington Consensus “ignore[s] the broader social and political 
context” in which its policies are implemented (Kohl, 2002, 455). Still more importantly, the 
philosophy that motivates structural adjustment and Washington-Consensus-style economic 
policy is not always right for countries trying to meet the basic needs of their population. As 
Benería and Feldman (1992) write, “the assumption that getting prices right is of greater concern 
than considerations of social justice results in policies that have been shown to have a negative 
impact upon the poorest sectors of society” (cited in Kohl, 2002, 456). 
The New Economic Policy featured five primary tenets: 
 
“1. Stable unified exchange rate backed by tight fiscal and monetary policies;  
2. Increased public-sector revenues, via tax reform and improved public sector prices; 
3. A reduced public sector wage bill, through reductions of employment in state 
enterprises…and reduced rates of real compensation; 
4. An effective elimination of debt servicing, through a combination of rescheduling with 
official creditors, and a unilateral suspension of payments to private creditors until a more 
fundamental debt settlement could be arranged; 
5. A resumption of concessional foreign financial assistance, from foreign governments 
and the multilateral institutions” (Sachs & Morales, 1989, 74).  
 
After 1985, the economy stabilized significantly, which was most observable in the fact 
that hyperinflation stopped after implementation of the NEP (Van Dijk, 1999, 3). Although the 
economy was stabilized, domestic savings and investment remained low. In order to further 
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stimulate the economy, the government chose to privatize the largest nationalized companies 
(Law of Capitalization) simultaneously with beginning a program of decentralized decision-
making (Law of Popular Participation) and social expenditures (Emergency Social Fund, Social 
Investment Fund) (Van Dijk, 1999, 3). This stabilization eliminated the panic conditions 
surrounding the hyperinflation in 1984 and 1985 (Sachs & Morales, 1989, 78). 
However, Morales (1989) notes that structural adjustment in Bolivia left several 
significant obstacles to long-term economic development (78). First, he observes that income 
inequality is significant, and that the resulting economic rift has led to political conflict. Morales 
notes that “the key political problem is to moderate the newly continuous confrontation between 
powerful social groups, such as organized labor and private capital” However, he concedes that 
this a political stopgap, and not “effective for a long term development strategy” (78). 
Morales cites the need to “promote a more equal distribution of income [with] greater 
public spending on education in the rural sector, where most of Bolivia’s poorest citizens live. 
Investment in the human capital of the rural peasantry is a key factor in long-term economic 
development” (78). Rural poverty was not a problem that was easily remedied through structural 
adjustment, although policy designers had hoped that the SAP would help economic biases that 
traditionally favored industry over agriculture.  
However, “farmers have not become the winners of adjustment” (Van Dijk, 1999, 9). The 
policy regarding the rural and agricultural sector of Bolivia’s economy was poorly defined from 
the start, and—following the nature of SAPs to curtail social programs as wasteful government 
spending—support services for the agricultural sector were cut during this time. Notably, the 
Andean peasant sector was the target of social, rather than economic, programs. Peasants, 
members of non-majority ethnic groups, and agricultural producers were social dependents but 
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not productive members of the state economy, and thus were not built into the state’s economic 
planning (Van Dijk, 1999, 10). 
Although the closure of the state mining corporation, which resulted in massive 
unemployment, has been studied at length, the government’s decision to liberalize the import of 
agricultural and livestock products has been less scrutinized. This is significant given that the 
liberalization of these imports primarily affected weakened the Bolivian peasant economy—
already the site of poverty—and further reduced rural employment (Wanderley, 2009, 257).  
Additionally, the growth that had been promised in the SAP did not materialize: average 
annual per capita GDP growth was only 1.6 percent in the period 1990-99, and 0.6 percent in 
2000-05 (Wanderley, 2009, 256). Unemployment following the implementation of structural 
adjustment was particularly severe for women, particularly from 1997 onwards (Wanderley, 
2009, 257). In 1999, 8.5 percent of economically active women were unemployed (Wanderley, 
2009, 258). The economic condition of Bolivia’s women following structural adjustment is 
particularly important considering that formal employment has never been the norm: in 1992, 
61% of working women were not in formal employment, making their means of support even 
more tenuous (Wanderley, 2009, 258).  
In order to explore the policies that evolved from the NEP, I will look at El Plan de 
Todos, “The Plan for All,” and several of its constituent parts: (1) the Law of Capitalization 
(privatization of five main state industries), (2) The Law of Popular Participation (administrative 
and fiscal decentralization) as well as (3) the Emergency Social Fund and the Social Investment 
Fund, two compensatory social investment mechanisms that were instituted contemporaneously 
in order to mitigate the effects of adjustment.  
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Kohl (2002) describes the purpose of the NEP, particularly of the Law of Capitalization, 
as not “to replace an oppressive government with an enlightened one but rather to replace a 
corporate state that limits private economic activity with a neoliberal one that promotes it.” The 
Law of Capitalization featured three distinct stages: “capitalization, distribution of ownership, 
and reform of the social security system” (Van Dijk, 1999, 6). However, “the process of 
capitalization is particularly concentrated in sectors with oligopolistic and monopolistic 
characteristics” and thus faced obstacles from its inception (Van Dijk, 1999, 6).  
In particular, the new pension scheme had a particular conception of who it would 
benefit: the new social security plan would provide citizens over age 65 with an annual 
retirement bonus (Van Dijk, 1999, 7). However, because the average life expectancy in Bolivia 
at the time the plan was designed was 59, the plan would almost exclusively benefit the better 
off, who also had a longer life expectancy. The shift of Bolivia’s social security benefits from the 
general population to the wealthy (via the more germane proxy of age) is an excellent example of 
the effects of structural adjustment via privatization on the poor. 
Although many people of Bolivia lost social security benefits upon the implementation of 
the Law of Capitalization, the law was successful at attracting foreign investment to the country. 
Although foreign investment as a boost to the national economy may seem like a general good, 
in reality, the effects are less evenly distributed (Van Dijk, 1999, 7). The Law of Capitalization 
did little to bolster the domestic entrepreneurial sector, which would have been the major source 
of domestic private savings.  
The effect of the Law of Capitalization was experienced daily. The cost of energy and 
basic services dramatically increased following the privatization of oil and gas production (Kohl, 
2002, 456). The public discontent with the economic reorganization was visible: although the 
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SAP was supposed to have improved the economic welfare of Bolivia as a whole, the response 
showed otherwise. Cycles of protest increased in frequency and severity after the implementation 
of the NEP. The country shut down three times between February 2000 and April 2001. 
Although the NEP had promised a slew of new jobs, employment grew at the 2.8%, the same 
rate as before the implementation of the Law of Capitalization (Kohl, 2002, 456). Although not 
all economic troubles could be linked to economic restructuring, “almost every protest included 
demands to end neoliberal economic policies” (Kohl, 2002, 456).  
The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) (1994) made three significant changes to 
domestic politics in Bolivia. First, the share of the national budget directed towards municipal 
governments was doubled, from 10% to 20%. Second, neighborhood and indigenous 
organizations gained legal status through Grassroots Territorial Organizations (GTOs), which 
allowed them to become involved in planning at the municipal level. Finally, Oversight 
Committees were formed, made up of representatives of these GTOs, to disperse municipal 
budgets (Kohl, 2003b, 343).  
Decentralization as a function of pro-growth reforms is not a policy move unique to 
Bolivia: it has been part of Washington-Consensus style policies globally. Unsurprising, then, is 
the link between decentralization policies and inequality. Decentralization is likely to increase 
inequality within states as national governments are typically those responsible for taking on the 
task of redistributive funding. Additionally, decentralization is likely to leave gaps in critical 
public services like health and education (Kohl, 2003b 154).  
Additionally, decentralization is often characterized in policy rhetoric as a shift in the 
state budget (and thus, state priorities) from the elites in the state capital to the everyman in the 
provinces. However, decentralization in practice has historically offered local elites more 
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opportunities to capture benefits more effectively than if those benefits are administered by the 
federal government (Kohl, 2003b, 154).  
The LPP also contained problematic ambiguities regarding which local organizations it 
would accept as legal entities. The ongoing issues in recognition led to awareness of other issues, 
most crucially that although the LPP had committed itself “to promote equal access of women 
and men to positions within the GTOs” (Ley 1551, art. 8), it contained a “structural bias against 
women” (Kohl, 2003b, 157). The historical function of campesina unions in Bolivia had 
historically been to support men’s unions on sectoral issues such as receiving food aid and 
income-generating projects. Because of their historical role as subordinate to men’s unions, 
campesina unions were systematically excluded from legal recognition under the LPP (Kohl, 
2003b, 157). 
Another stumbling block for the LPP was its inability to make legal space for indigenous 
organizations that had also been subordinated to the campesino unions. Ayllus, a pre-Colombian 
form of social organizing, overlapped in purpose with the campesino unions. However, as the 
unions had taken responsibility for relations with the Bolivian government, the ayllus were not 
legally recognized by the LPP. In the case of categorical exclusion of women’s organization, as 
in the case of the ayllus, the LPP was operating without regard to Bolivia’s historical and social 
context.  
Jørgensen and Van Domelen (1999) describe the need for social funds in the era of 
Washington-Consensus economics as a byproduct of three economic factors that have the 
capacity to dramatically increase wealth, but also dramatically increase inequality and social 
risk: globalization, technology, and open political systems (2). However, Jørgensen and Van 
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Domelen (1999) also observe that “there is no certainty that any improvements will be widely 
shared across individuals, households, ethnic groups, communities, and countries,” (2).  
The first iteration of a compensatory social fund, constructed to provide temporary 
employment to those who had lost their jobs in an adjustment economy, was the Emergency 
Social Fund (1986), later replaced by the Social Investment Fund (1990). Graham (1992) notes 
that the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) (implemented in 1986 alongside the NEP) is demand 
driven, responding to applications for projects, and is therefore efficient and transparent. 
However, that structure means that it does not target the poorest population in Bolivia: the 
population least likely to be able to submit a viable proposal (Graham, 1992, 1233). Because of 
its transparent nature, the Emergency Social Fund was said to have avoided politicization. 
 However, the choice to create a social fund that did not serve the poorest—already the 
most disadvantaged by the stoppage of social services during structural adjustment—can be read 
as a political choice. Additionally, the Emergency Social Fund was instituted as a temporary 
measure, primarily to compensate for the job losses experienced during the adjustment process. 
The choice to build in a safety net for the expected job losses was prudent, but should not be 
mistaken for a long-term solution to persistent poverty.  
 Additionally, like the Law of Popular Participation, the Emergency Social Fund faced 
structural limitations in its outreach. Per capita expenditures by the ESF were the lowest in 
poorest regions, and outreach to poor communities was unsuccessful even after hiring a targeted 
outreach coordinator (Graham, 1992, 1235). Additionally, the poorest households in Bolivia 
were those headed by women. However, women constituted only 1 percent of those hired by the 
Emergency Social Fund (Graham, 1992, 1235). Further, the nature of ESF employment worked 
against worker empowerment. Workers were prevented from organizing because (1) ESF labor 
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was temporary, and, due to the economic adjustment, workers had to (2) relocate or (3) switch 
occupations (Graham, 1992, 1236).  
 However, the ESF was the component of the Plan de Todos that was most effectively 
channeled into support for regional and national governments in Bolivia. Citizens saw their 
families employed and their children fed by these compensatory programs, even if they were 
only stopgap measures. Specifically, the ESF was used as political propaganda during the 1989 
electoral campaign, when featured TV ads showed candidate Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 
distributing milk and bread at an ESF breakfast project for schoolchildren (Graham, 1992, 1239). 
Here, the gendered imagery of the ESF stands out: the ESF serving as a mother figure in a 
struggling economy, making sure the nation’s children are fed.  
 Although the ESF was a propaganda tool that received a positive response, there was no 
correlation between the location of ESF infrastructure projects and votes. Graham (1992) 
observes “what may be most beneficial at the community level, such as sewage systems or roads 
may be less popular at the individual level than football fields and school desks [that individual 
politicians contributed]” (1242). However, the general attitude towards these compensatory 
social programs remained positive, and—unlike the various reforms in the Plan de Todos—”it is 
plausible to assume that [the ESF] played a role in strengthening support for the Paz Estenssoro 
government, if not directly for economic adjustment” (Graham, 1992, 1244). This was 
particularly true in small and/or remote communities that had traditionally been neglected by the 
Bolivian government (Graham, 1992, 1245). Although compensatory social programs helped 
ease some of the pain of adjustment, they were unlikely to have ever reached the citizens most in 
need of services, to whom performance legitimacy was least likely to be convincing in the first 
place.  
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 Although the compensatory social programs partially filled a needed role, they were 
created in order to make up for the economic turndown produced by the implematation of 
Structural Adjustment in Bolivia. While these reforms were intended to create growth that would 
improve Bolivia’s economy, “economic growth was weak, especially in comparison with 
demographic growth” (Wanderley, 2009, 256). Further, as labor became less regulated—in an 
attempt to create economic growth—temporary and fixed term labor contracts became more 
common, and wages for both skilled and unskilled workers decreased (Wanderley, 2009, 259). 
Compensatory programs that offered short term employment were necessary because workers 
who lost their jobs in government industries, particularly the Bolivian petroleum and railroad 
industries, were unable to find comparable private-sector employment (Kohl, 2002, 460). Even 
though production in Bolivian industries like oil and natural gas has risen, the decreased 
government revenue from these industries after structural adjustment is expected to cost four 
billion dollars between 1997-2017 (Kohl, 2002, 460). Structural adjustment policies, largely 
aligned around the belief that any economic growth, regardless of direction, allocation, or means, 
largely failed Bolivia.  
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) 
 
Although Poverty Reduction is, in name, the focus of the Bolivian PRSP, known as the 
Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS), the text reveals a fundamental understanding on 
the part of the policy architects that sees poverty only as a byproduct of economic growth. This 
growth-centric view of poverty reduction helped perpetuate SAPs policies that favored free 
markets over people: seeing it reappear in the BPRS calls into question whether it marks a 
significant departure from SAPs (BPRS, 2001, 22). However, the BPRS (2001) does note the 
detrimental impact of poorly distributed economic growth—income inequality—and the 
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importance of growth in labor-intensive sectors (22).  This acknowledgment of a need for growth 
at the populous ‘base’ of the economy, rather than in foreign direct investment (FDI) where 
Bolivia had previously seen significant growth, is notable.  
We can read this as a document as a fundamentally growth-oriented policy from its 
outset. Although the BPRS promises to reduce poverty, the preface is upfront about the supposed 
importance of individual responsibility for poverty: “there is no suggestion in the BPRS that the 
State along should be responsible for fighting poverty, for if [sic] does not pretend to encourage 
a return to State paternalism: rather, the fight against poverty calls for joint responsibility to be 
shouldered by the various members of society and State” (BPRS, 11). Additionally, any poverty 
reduction promised in the BPRS is fundamentally contingent upon economic growth, alongside a 
few strategic pro-poor interventions: “the economic growth anticipated in the BPRS is an 
essential factor in reducing poverty. Greater economic activity will make it possible to expand 
employment levels of both skilled and unskilled labor” (BPRS, 2001, 197).  
The social investment programs that had originated during Bolivia’s SAP made a 
resurgence during the BPRS, when a new version of the Social Investment Fund (FIS) made a 
significant investment in a rural sanitation program, leading to a significant increase in 
availability of clean water (BPRS, 2001, 27). Although the PRS was expected to be more 
attentive to the unmet basic needs that define poverty, the stop-gap programs that characterized 
adjustment were still necessary.  
These stop-gap funds come up again in a discussion to “increase safety and protection for 
the poor” (BPRS, 2001, 58). Emergency employment programs like the Fundo Emergencia 
Social (FES) were the only method cited to provide additional protection to “children, the 
elderly, victims of violence, and those facing high economic risks” (BPRS, 58). 
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Much has been made of the interactive/collaborative process that went into creating the 
BPRS. A cornerstone of the PRSP process is meant to be “country ownership,” and, to fit into 
Bolivia’s push for Popular Participation (with the Ley de Participation Popular, along with 
various decentralization initiatives that pushed governance into the municipalities), there were 
three key stakeholder meetings that contributed to the formation of the BPRS, including the 
National Dialogue 2000. However, none of these meetings resulted in a meaningful effort by the 
government to elicit new information from civil society.  
The Dialogue 2000 featured three organizing themes: “Social, Economic, and Political.” 
The Social agenda included many of the provisions of ‘basic needs’ related to poverty: “road 
infrastructure, production support, education, health, basic sanitation, and land” (BPRS, 44). 
Although all the issues on the ‘Social’ agenda have a gendered nature, none of the topics 
included a discussion of gender.   
The final paragraph of the preface singles out for praise a seminar called “The 
Government Listens” that included the participation of civil society, but does not mention 
whether this was a productive or particularly inclusive forum. Rather, what is shown to be 
important is the Government’s demonstration of listening (BPRS, 2001, 15). The outcomes of 
this listening process remain ambiguous.  
The second workshop as part of “The Government Listens” focused on “issues of 
Capacities” including gender (BPRS, 2001, 53). However, the outcomes of this seminar included 
discussions of “education; health; basic sanitation; and participation” that did not consider the 
importance of gender (BPRS, 2001, 54). There was a short discussion section on gender, which 
reads “the importance of developing an information system that emphasizes gender issues was 
mentioned” (BPRS, 2001, 54), a statement which seems to neglect that each of the issues 
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mentioned immediately prior has a significant gender dimension. Finally, throughout the 
discussion of “The Government Listens,” there is no mention of who the delegates to this 
seminar were; essentially who was being listened to.  
The way these stakeholder meetings are described as part of the PRSP process is 
important given the fact that Bolivian women had attempted to take part in these dialogues, with 
a highly critical position on the policy that was being adopted, particularly that it seemed to be so 
concerned with ‘growth’ in the abstract with little regard for the possible consequences. Women 
in civil society organized themselves in a ‘women’s coordinating committee,’ which produced 
several documents and reports that were meant to guide the PRSP process (Van Staveren, 2008, 
298). However, these reports went unutilized. Although the government made some information 
available on gender issues in Bolivian society, those reports, too, “were hardly used in the PRSP 
process” (Van Staveren, 2008, 298).  
 These missed opportunities for considering the role of gender become obvious when the 
BPRS considers “Strategic Actions” (BPRS, 2001, 66). Issues like land ownership, which are 
tied in very significant ways to patriarchal systems of power relations, are never related to 
gender. A second discussion of the legal security of land ownership, again, fails to mention any 
relationship between land titles and gender (BPRS, 110). The issues in accessing and 
regularizing land titles for the rural poor is a significant issue, but when compounded with the 
fact that women—a backbone of agricultural labor—are often prevented from holding land at all, 
become still more complex. This question does come up in the specific discussion on gender, but 
is appears divorced from context, apart from anywhere it might have been useful (BPRS, 2001, 
127).  
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Similarly, the BPRS discussion of potential improvements to education includes a token 
of mention of gender, but no gender-disaggregated data (BPRS, 2001, 85). For example, 
statistics such as “78 percent of poor rural households do not have access to drinkable water and 
72 percent lack basic sanitation service” should be disaggregated (BPRS, 35). These are statistics 
that need to be disaggregated by gender. Female-headed households in poor communities in 
Bolivia are statistically more likely to be worse off that male-headed households, a fact that even 
makes it into the BPRS later (BPRS, 2001, 45; 126). The one gendered point cited is that 
“disparities in enrollment patterns by gender have fallen, although disparities remain between 
urban and rural areas” (BPRS, 2001, 85).  
Here, again, there is none of the gender-focused analysis that was intended to help 
differentiate PRSPs from SAPs. Rather, by including issues like education, the PRSP’s adoption 
of a normative legitimacy based on ideas of social investment helped change its marketing, if not 
its substance. Failure to use gender-disaggregated data, or to replace it with a qualitative survey 
of women’s experiences in poverty, shows a lack of knowledge in how poverty was experienced 
by women. The most common language used around gender issues is “cross-cutting,” as in, “the 
BPRS incorporates a cross cutting treatment of gender, environmental, and ethnic issues.” 
Although the BPRS analysis of gender is meant to be cross-cutting, the only substantive 
discussion of gender in the multivolume policy is cordoned off in its own section.  
Most notably, even the discussion of “improving comprehensive child care” is not 
gendered: it does not mention women other than by implication (BPRS, 2001, 107). It is, again, 
written from a social investment perspective: “investment in the childhood care and development 
will increase the capacities and living conditions of the poorest population (107), and 
“investment in comprehensive childcare programs is justified given the high social return that 
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economic development ensures” (BPRS, 2001, 108). When gender equality is mentioned in the 
BRPS, it is included alongside various unrelated issues: “the Strategy also includes actions 
targeting the sustainable optimization of the environment, gender equality, and equality among 
ethnic groups, and institution building.” (BPRS, 2001, 17) 
The BPRS grapples with the idea of “social exclusion” as a negative consequence or 
corollary of poverty. Originally mentioned at the Dialogue 2000, social exclusion was 
understood as “a problem related with gender and ethnic discrimination, with limitations on the 
exercise of citizens’ rights.” Although mentions of social exclusion are included in the preface 
and conclusion of the BPRS, there is no substantive connection made between how gender and 
ethnic discrimination negatively influences Bolivian citizens’ ability to exercise their rights.  
 Irene Van Staveren (2008) notes that the BPRS does not use any gender disaggregated 
data in its description of poverty in the country, nor does it mention the country’s five-year plan 
(2003-2007) to improve women’s position in terms of poverty reduction, access to land, credit, 
and the labor market. One of the most significant issues with the analysis of poverty in the BPRS 
is that it understands poverty at the household level (Iversen, 2003, 5; BPRS, 2001, 126). For 
example, the targets for increase in income are set by family (BPRS, 2001, 176). This does not 
show the breakdown of labor within the household, particularly of care labor, which is likely to 
fall disproportionately on the women. Additionally, it can create misconceptions about the held 
wealth in the household: although a family’s income may be acceptable, the women in the 
household may not be financially independent.  
However, the discussion of Strategic Actions around microfinance and banking in the 
BPRS are encouraging. The discussion of microfinance initially considers on the need to provide 
banking services to rural populations, including money transfers—rather than focusing 
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exclusively on microcredit (BPRS, 2001, 73). The discussion pays particular attention to 
“promoting financial services, particularly for low-income women.”  
This encouragement fades when women are encouraged to contribute to Bolivia’s 
economic revival through “a renewal of the traditional capabilities of women (handcrafts, small 
manufacturing, medicinal plants)” (BPRS, 2001, 128). Restrictive views of women in solely 
feminized labor is not useful for economic revival or women’s empowerment. Megan 
MacKenzie (2009) describes the same phenomenon in a Sierra Leonean context: “In fact, 
[through the program] so many females were trained in these few trades, some communities had 
an overabundance of gara tie-dyers or soap-makers, rendering the skills nearly useless. These 
options were highly gendered and were ineffectual because they were not chosen in consultation 
with communities or female beneficiaries” (209).  
There are myriad references to “human capital” and “social investment” throughout the 
BPRS, which translate the experience of unmet needs in poverty to the language of markets. “To 
this end, the State should guarantee the provision of social services with the greatest social 
return,” reads one section on “developing the productive capabilities of the poor” (BPRS, 2001, 
82). The few gender policies, especially those related to “maternal and child health” in the BPRS 
are heavily entrenched in the language of “human capital” (BPRS, 2001, 24). Here, women are 
brought into the discussion on poverty reduction in the context of their role in social 
reproduction. A program of National Maternity and Child Insurance (Seguro Nacional de 
Maternidad y Niñez—SNMN) was established, and the health priority in the 1980s was mother 
and child health with a focus on child immunization (BPRS, 2001, 26).  
Adult women, other than as pregnant mothers, receive no other mentions in the context of 
social policy in the BPRS. They are mentioned in economic sections as possible holders of 
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businesses eligible for microfinance, but this designation excludes the poorest and most 
marginalized women, who are unlikely to be in this situation or financially autonomous. 
Additionally, the fact that Bolivian women would have been eligible for prenatal and maternity 
care did not meant they received it. Particularly in rural areas, the locations most likely to have 
poor indigenous women, temporary health staff were given one-year assignments, which led to 
high turnover rates that compounded an additional staff shortage (BPRS, 2001, 26). Although the 
BPRS includes a discussion of poverty and gender, the PRSP fails to address the structural 
causes of poverty in a way that would have made it a distinct document from the SAPs that had 
preceded it. Rather, the PRSP’s reliance on economic growth and social investment show that 



















Early Structural Adjustment and the Kaunda Government 
 
Zambia’s economy, backed by plentiful copper resources, thrived briefly after gaining 
independence from Britain in 1964. However, the country has experienced economic tumult ever 
since the decline in copper prices in 1974. Between 1974 and 1985, GDP growth remained at an 
average of 1 percent per year, significantly below the level of population growth, which was 
closer to 3.3 percent per year. The decline in copper revenue, followed by heavy government 
control of the economy, led Zambia to begin borrowing heavily from other countries to maintain 
its level of imports (Saasa, 1996, 4). Due to this prolonged pattern of heavy borrowing, Zambia 
quickly became the most heavily indebted country in the world relative to its GDP (Saasa, 1996, 
4). This financially vulnerable position first brought Zambia into negotiations with the World 
Bank and the IMF in 1983.  
The 1983 agreement represented Zambia’s first step into austerity from a heavily 
controlled economy. It included terms that devalued Zambia’s currency, the kwacha, limited 
wage increases to 5 percent, decontrolled the prices of essential commodities, and removed the 
subsidies on agricultural staples like maize and fertilizers (Simultanyi, 1996, 826). However, the 
most comprehensive—and most controversial—package of adjustment policies were installed in 
1985. The 1985 program of liberalization continued in the vein of the 1983 policies, but went 
farther, including liberalization of agricultural marketing, public sector reform, and significant 
reductions in the civil service. The most controversial aspect was the foreign exchange auction 
program, designed to eliminate the import licensing system (Simultanyi, 1996, 826).  
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As in Bolivia, upon the introduction of privatization of state industries and the closure of 
state welfare systems, the government was forced to introduce compensatory social policies. One 
such policy was a food-coupon system, put in place after the removal of subsidies on maize, a 
Zambian staple crop, led to food riots (Saasa, 2002, 41; Noyoo, 2010, 88). The food riots that 
erupted when the costs of maize became out of reach of Zambian families were an early sign that 
the legitimation strategy of promised GDP growth was inadequate in practice. The coupon 
system, introduced in 1989, was intended to be a short-term “palliative” to ward off political 
objections to structural adjustment that might suggest that its human costs were too high (Noyoo, 
2010, 89). The removal of the maize subsidies and the resulting riots highlighted the early 
shortcomings of an economic improvement policy that promised growth but failed to distribute 
its gains evenly and let people go hungry.  
Geisler (1992) writes that “it is doubtful if the poor really benefited from this supposedly 
targeted scheme.” There were numerous barriers preventing this superficially compensatory 
program from reaching the people it promised to target. One of the most significant of these 
barriers was that the people eligible for the coupons were the least likely to be able to afford time 
or the transportation to receive the coupons. These problems were compounded by problems of 
implementation: the coupons and the bags of meal they could be redeemed for were both issued 
irregularly, and were only available in sites miles away from rural poor homes (Geisler, 1992, 
124).  
A second compensatory program adopted by the Zambian government to make up for the 
painful effects of Structural Adjustment was the Social Action Program. Launched in 1993, the 
program had multiple foci: health, education, training, gender initiatives and transportation. At 
its core, the Social Action Program was intended to improve access to social services and create 
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employment opportunities for the poor (Noyoo, 2010, 90). However, in the ten years since 
Zambia’s SAP had been in place, the government’s ability to provide even these compensatory 
services had been undermined significantly. Austerity-related cuts had decreased the 
government’s ability to provide social services, particularly as compared to what that capacity 
had been in the early days of the Zambian republic. The function of policies like the coupon 
system for staple crops and the Social Action program, then, was as a political reinforcement for 
an economic policy that was not serving the people.  
Although the Social Action Program was intended to target many of the disadvantaged 
groups that the coupon system was unable to reach—particularly women and children—only 2.7 
percent of its budget was allocated under the subheading “Women in Development” (Geisler, 
1992, 125). Households headed by women have been consistently recognized as being at greater 
risk of poverty, and made up between one-third and one-half of all households in Zambia in 
1992. The fact that women were not targeted in a meaningful way in either of the compensatory 
programs is significant because it assumes that the effects of structural adjustment would have 
been gender-neutral, a now well-disproven theory.  
Another downfall of performance legitimacy and structural adjustment was the 
replacement of the existing exchange rate system with an auction system. The auction system led 
to a rapid devaluation of the kwacha, an escalation in the urban cost of living, and a deterioration 
in workers living conditions (Simultanyi, 1996, 827). The revolt against adjustment was 
immediate—in 1987, Zambia’s President Kaunda canceled the IMF agreement. International 
financial institutions and donor countries responded by denying the country resources (Saasa, 
1996, 13; Simultanyi, 1996, 827).  
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The primary leader of the opposition to the auction system, and opposition to economic 
liberalization in general, was organized labor leader Frederick Titus Jacob Chiluba. Chiluba’s 
Republican Party formed a coalition of pressure from civil society, organized labor, and groups 
within the state system to pressure the Kaunda government to cancel the liberalization regime 
(Saasa, 2002, 42).  
Following this successful mobilization of civil society and anti-neoliberal pressure 
groups, the Kaunda government replaced the Structural Adjustment Program with its own New 
Economic Recovery Program (NERP), which ran from July 1987 to December 1988 (Saasa, 
2002, 42). Importantly, NERP was introduced with the slogan ‘growth from our own resources’ 
(Saasa, 2002, 43). The desire for economic growth from “our own resources,” free from the 
constraints and conditionalities that accompanied loans and policy advisories from the 
IMF/World Bank showed that policy legitimacy premised solely on economic growth was not 
enough for the public. In attempts to correct this sense of illegitimacy, PRSPs were introduced 
later with “country ownership” provisions. Clearly, the results were not the only unsatisfactory 
experience of economic liberalization: rather, the design and advertisement of the NERP 
reflected a clear desire to create development policy that moved beyond the dictates of SAPs.  
 The NERP functioned like a homegrown SAP, but reinstated popular policies such as 
agricultural subsidies and price controls for staples like maize. However, this program failed to 
attract the support from international donors that would have kept it solvent, which left Zambia 
running up debt trying to maintain the subsidies on which people depended. Maize subsidies 
constituted 17 percent of Zambia’s budget in 1988 and 16 percent in 1989. During the NERP, 
inflation in Zambia increased by 60 percent, and its external debt increased to 159 percent of its 
GNP ($6,874 million) (Geisler, 1992, 114).  
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Later Structural Adjustment and the Chiluba Government 
 
Although the Kaunda government attempted to respond to critiques of the SAP and the 
NERP, widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s perceived economic mismanagement 
eventually led to Zambia’s first multiparty election. Frederick Chiluba’s successful leadership of 
the opposition to the auction system swept him into the presidency in 1991. He ran on the slogan 
“The Hour Has Come,” referring to the impending end of the Kaunda government’s 
mismanagement of the Zambian economy. Chiluba, a former union leader, won 80% majority in 
both urban and rural areas in what was largely a referendum on the recent experience of 
structural adjustment in Zambia (Geisler, 1992, 113).  
The election of the very labor leader who had made himself the face of the opposition of the 
1983 and 1985 liberalization policies further speaks to the people’s discomfort with the 
imposition of Structural Adjustment. However, upon his election, Chiluba reintroduced 
liberalization policies altogether similar to the ones he had fought previously.  
The reintroduction of economic liberalization did not occur without a struggle: “in June 
1991, the government requested the IMF allow it to postpone a scheduled round of maize meal 
subsidies for fear that it might provoke rioting before elections. The IMF refused and instead 
suspended all financial disbursements to Zambia” (Simultanyi, 828). Structural Adjustment 
continually found itself at odds with the Zambian local interests and the poor, as characterized by 
both the 1987 and the 1987 clashes over the importance of liberalization. As in Bolivia, 
economic liberalization accompanied governmental decentralization. Implementation of the 
Public Service Reform Program in November 1993 restructured public services—preparing 
many for privatization—and increased the strength of local governments (Noyoo, 2010, 65). 
Combining privatization and decentralization worked particularly well because, rather than 
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better-regulated parastatal organizations, once both economic resources and governing power 
were dispersed, there was very little responsibility for oversight on the part of the government.  
The reintroduction of the SAP under the newly elected Chiluba government experienced the 
same legitimacy issues of the early incarnations of adjustment. As Ndangwa Noyoo (2010) 
writes “as in the past, the implementation of the SAP by the Zambian government, in collusion 
with its donor ‘masters,’ was shrouded in secrecy and was neither transparent nor consultative in 
approach (65).”  
The people of Zambia felt the effects of the SAP immediately, and the results were not 
confined to the GDP or the country’s net production. Rather than liberalization producing the 
economic growth that it had promised, which would have reinforced the policy’s legitimacy the 
economy contracted and Zambians saw their standard of living decline.  Over the course of 
Zambia’s privatization regime, 19 state companies were sold and 70,000 public sector workers 
lost their jobs. Malnutrition affected 50 percent of children under 15, and at least 30 per cent of 
adults. (Noyoo, 2010, 65). Through the work of Vergard Iversen, Naila Kabeer and others, we 
know that women are the first to experience malnutrition due to unequal intra-household power 
dynamics: women surrender their access to food or other resources to feed the male breadwinner 
or the children (Iversen, 2003, 5; Geisler, 1992, 124).  
The dispute over agriculture occurring contemporaneously with the debates over structural 
adjustment highlights several issues with legitimacy. Although decisions over whether to 
subsidize maize production were a constant discussion in Zambia, economically meaningful 
investments in Zambia’s agricultural sector had been neglected for years. Agriculture had been 
identified as a growth sector in various development plans, and was targeted for privatization as 
a potential opportunity to increase profits.  
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Agricultural production, then, would shift from parastatals to comparatively poor producers, 
despite little existing infrastructure supporting these new farmers. Gisela Geisler (1992) writes: 
“support for agriculture had mainly favored large commercial farmers, for without extensive 
improvements win the whole marketing system—far better roads, good credit facilities, efficient 
marketing agencies, etcetera—poor and middle peasants cannot begin to take advantage of 
higher producer prices” (116). The government’s decision to privatize agricultural production, 
which had, until the early 1990s, been run by agricultural cooperatives and parastatals—even 
though the country did not have the necessary agricultural infrastructure to make such a 
transition—shows a focus on abstract ‘growth’ objectives and little attention to the realities of 
Zambians, especially poor agricultural producers.  
The narratives that surrounded the decision to privatize, including to privatize agriculture in 
the SAP and from the governing UNIP (United National Independence Party), suggested that 
privatization create a more profitable Zambian agricultural sector that would, in turn, benefit the 
nation. However, the rhetoric of economic growth and development not only ignored the existing 
paucity of infrastructure for privatization, it ignored the timetable for agricultural production in 
Zambia. The liberalization of maize farming was announced in September 1990, only one month 
before the end of the agricultural season (Geisler, 1992, 118). Likely taking advantage of small 
farmers’ unpreparedness, distributors set the price for maize very low. Farmers attempted to 
resist, hoping for an increase in the price or another market for their crops. Eventually, much of 
the maize harvest for that year ended up wasted or smuggled into Malawi or The Democratic 
Republic of Congo (then Zaire) as farmers attempted to earn a livelihood in the newly privatized 
industry.  
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This shift was, unsurprisingly, not a success: waves of local protests sprang up in the 
agricultural sector that marked another challenge to this legitimacy narrative.  
“In September 1991, 27,000 bags of maize were set on fire in Mumbwa, having stayed 
uncollected for three years, allegedly because of transport problems, although the depot was 
only 100km west of Lusaka on the main rod to Mongu.” (Geisler, 1992, 116).  
The gender dimension to these shifts in agricultural production is particularly significant. 
Particularly in peasant families, where women already performed the majority of informal labor 
in both agriculture and care work, pressures to produce more in order to sustain an economic 
livelihood often leads to an increase in that unpaid, informal labor (Geisler, 1992, 126). Despite 
the major role that women play in agricultural production and in maintenance of the home, they 
are the least likely to have a say in the proceeds of what they produce. The idea of the benefits of 
economic growth being self-evidencing must have seemed particularly distant to the Zambian 
women who were left to absorb the extra labor costs during the process of structural adjustment.  
As in Bolivia, although compensatory programs were implemented in the wake of Structural 
Adjustment, it is important to see that those programs were only responding to problems that 
Structural Adjustment had created. The government’s creation of temporary subsidies for maize 
was a necessary step in order to allow people to be able to feed themselves. When the 
government, following the adjustment policies of deregulation and privatization, removed price 
control from maize meal, the price increased over 100% (Simultanyi, 1996, 827). In 1991, the 
government found itself unable to pay the salaries for civil servants. They printed money in order 
to pay their employees, which resulted in an annual rate of inflation that year of 129% 
(Simultanyi, 1996, 828). The way Structural Adjustment was marketed, the policies deregulation, 
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and privatization were supposed to lead to development and economic stability. Rather, pursuit 
of growth without concern for consequences led to the creation of even more problems.   
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
 
The Zambian PRSP process began in December 2000, with the final PRSP completed in 
May 2002 and approved by IFIs in the same month (Bwalya et al., 2004, 17). The timing and 
implementation of the PRSP were closely tied to the country’s negotiations over debt relief and 
Zambia’s status as a HIPC. The PRSP negotiation process also coincided with the electoral 
process in Zambia, which affected the participation of various groups (Bwalya et al., 2004, 17).  
Unlike the SAP, the PRSP—as policy to that promised benefit the poor—was intended to 
be closely tied to the “grassroots” and to civil society in general: “country ownership” had been 
promised in the World Bank guidelines for PRSPs. However, what the role of civil society in the 
PRSP process would be ambiguous at the outset: did the ‘country ownership’ that the PRSP 
guidelines called for mean participation by the government or did it require civil society 
involvement as well? During the preparation of the Interim PRSP, the several actors in civil 
society contacted the Zambian Ministry of Finance to be included.  
After the Interim PRSP had been accepted and the process of writing the PRSP began, 90 
organizations, led by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) joined an umbrella 
group of NGOs which called itself Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) (Bwalya et al., 
2004, 20). Following the submission of the interim PRSP to the IFIs, the CSPR published its 
own report in July 2001, called “A PRSP for Zambia – A Civil Society Perspective” (Bwalya et 
at., 2004, 21).  
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The civil society response to the draft PRSP clarified CSOs priorities but also noted 
significant inadequacies with the PRSP as it was originally written. In response to the interim 
PRSP’s language on gender, the CSO response stated, “the proposed budget for gender is not 
adequate particularly that gender is considered to be a cross-cutting issue” (CSPR, 2001).  
The PRSP process was organized around eight thematic working groups, which were 
meant to yield a PRSP that addressed problems that had been ignored by SAPs. The topics for 
these focus groups—macro-economic issues, agriculture, tourism, mining, industry, education, 
health, and governance—were decided in a stakeholders’ meeting.  
The process of Structural Adjustment in Zambia has been fraught with clashes between 
IFIs and the Zambian government, and between the Zambian government, and the urban working 
class, including organized labor and the poor. One of the obvious flaws in the original 
adjustment approach taken in Zambia was a lack of country ownership, as evidenced by the 
constant disagreement between IFIs and the national government over policy. In contrast, the 
“defining feature” of PRSPs are a sense of ‘country ownership’ and popular participation 
(Imboela, 2005, 436). However, in Bruce Lubinda Imboela’s critique of the PRSP process in 
Zambia, he acknowledges several points where PRSPs fail to make themselves distinct from 
SAPs. The three issues with PRSPs in the Zambian context—ways in which they reiterate the 
shortcomings of SAPs, are: that they fail to understand poverty structurally, that they do not 
describe poverty relationally, and that, most importantly, they do not actually encourage 
participation.  
 To Imboela’s first point, that PRSPs fail to understand poverty structurally, meaning, 
because of policies or processes. PRSPs, like SAPs before them, understand poverty as a lack of 
resources. PRSPs are marginally better about making that list more comprehensive—including 
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healthcare, education—rather than just a quantifiable sum of money. Rather, poverty needs to be 
understood as “a product of processes of power” (Imboela, 2005, 440). Otherwise, poverty is a 
descriptive term only, and not an analytical one. In Zambia, poor people observed that the 
adjustment and liberalization policies they had undergone were the major cause of poverty 
(Government of Zambia, 2002, as cited in Imboela, 2005, 440).  
A more specific example of Imboela’s critique: although one of the critical failures of the 
SAP was placing too much stock in developing Zambia’s agricultural sector without the requisite 
infrastructure or planning, the PRSP is quick to pin the hopes of poverty reduction on a similar 
agricultural boom. In laying out priorities for development, the PRSP reads: On several grounds, 
agriculture in Zambia combines the virtues of growth and equity and it is in this regard that 
enhanced agricultural productivity is being given the highest priority” (PRSP, 2002, 11). The 
focus on agriculture is justified in several ways, but mostly through economic desperation as the 
country attempted to pivot away from its historical dependence on mining: “Efficiency and quick 
response of [large-scale commercial agriculture] is crucial as Zambia faces an uncertain 
economic future following the announcement by Anglo American Corporation to pull out of 
mining interests in Zambia” (PRSP, 2002, 12). Pinning Zambia’s development hopes on an 
agricultural revival seems shortsighted given the problematics experienced during the SAP when 
the same strategy was employed. 
Importantly, Zambia’s PRSP clearly gives priority to large-scale agricultural producers. 
However, in a survey included in the PRSP document meant to communicate a better 
understanding of poverty by the writers, the majority of poor Zambians in Luapula Province 
believe the most important part of “a good life” is farming for food and a surplus to sell. 
Although there are poor farmers in Zambia, and the PRSP does focus on farming in Zambia, no 
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connection is made between improving conditions (particularly for small producers) in the 
agricultural sector and the poverty of the people who work in it.   
 This reflects a more general trend in the PRSP: it includes various surveys that clearly 
reflect consultation and surveys of the poor, the proposed interventions for poverty reduction do 
not appear related to that research. While the surveys of the rural poor concluded that problems 
such as cattle disease and inconsistent access to government or private credit were the primary 
causes of their economic hardship, the anti-poverty interventions listed in the PRSP focused on, 
among other issues, security in the border regions near Angola and The Democratic Republic of 
Congo. This is particularly significant because one of the few means of protest that had been 
available to impoverished agricultural producers in the 1990s, when the government had offered 
an unfeasibly low price for maize, had been to sell the grain across borders on the black market. 
Rather than ensuring that farmers can sustain a livelihood in Zambia, one of the PRSP 
interventions—seemingly uncalled for by any form of “participation”—prevents access to 
alternative, protest markets.  
 Returning to Imboela’s critique, the Zambian PRSP also does not consider poverty 
relationally: there is no connection made between the poor and the non-poor. Without 
considering the relationship of the poor to those who are better off in the Zambian economy, 
there is no possibility of addressing any of the broader social inequalities that accompany 
poverty. In Imboela’s words, the Zambian PRSP falsely argues that “it is possible to empower 
the powerless without disempowering the powerful.”  
This can be observed in language such as “growth-stimulating interventions are being 
placed at the centre of the PRSP together with pro-poor interventions that have been carefully 
chosen” (PRSP, 2002, 17). The idea of the centrality of economic growth being a disparate 
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economic objective from the empowerment of the poor is a false separation. In the case of SAPs, 
the austerity-oriented, radically ‘pro-growth’ policies were the same policies that did the most 
harm to the poor. Separating the potential effects of these pro-growth interventions from the 
PRSP agenda underscores the idea that the focus on poverty reduction is only nominal.  
This shortsightedness is also apparent in the PRSP’s limited understanding of gender: 
without understanding the way that poverty and the burden of economic adjustment 
disproportionately affect women, there is no chance of formulating more gender-equal policy 
(Geisler, 1992, 124). 
For example, Zambian women are often expected to make up, in unpaid, informal labor, 
for the care work or agricultural work that ceases to be subsidized under adjustment (Geisler, 
1992, 126). Without understanding the relational dynamics of poverty—between the poor and 
non-poor, between men and women—PRSPs and SAPs miss large portions of the picture. 
The PRSP does feature a section on gender as a “cross-cutting issue” which does show 
improvements over the SAP: the analysis of gender in the final version of the PRSP is relatively 
successful. Unlike Bolivia’s PRSP, Zambia’s considers the country’s existing gender policy. The 
PRSP also observes gender in some of the critical junctures where it had been ignored in the 
SAP, particularly in privatization of the agricultural economy:  
According to the CSO 1998 Living Conditions Survey, 83 percent of the people in 
rural areas were poor compared to 56 percent in urban areas. Additionally, the incidence 
of poverty by sex of household head showed that persons in female headed households 
(FHHs) were more likely to be extremely poor than those in male headed households 
(MHHs). 77 percent of all persons in FHHs were poor compared to 72 percent in MHHs. 
This situation has worsened from the mid-1980s due to the deteriorating economic 
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situation in the country. This is a confirmation that poverty affects women and men 
differently, hence the terminology ‘feminization of poverty.’ 
In terms of food poverty, 61 percent of FHHs faced food shortage compared to 52 
percent of MHHs. Moreover, FHHs more often have longer spells of food shortage. This 
has a differential impact on child malnutrition in FHHs compared to MHHs. The 
proportions of stunting and underweight are higher in FHHs (54 percent and 29 percent) 
than in MHHs (49 percent and 29 percent) (PRSP, 112).  
However, despite the section title, gender is not brought to the fore as a meaningful cross-
cutting issue. Rather, cross-cutting issues that are more easily framed according to a social 
investment perspective are highlighted in the introduction. For example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
is recognized with this language: “AIDS threatens the country’s capacity building efforts because 
it strikes the educated and skilled as well as the uneducated. Consequently, it reverses and 
impedes the country’s capacity by shortening human productivity and life expectancy” (PRSP, 
119). AIDS is highlighted using the social investment terms of humanity-as-capital, a hallmark 
of neoliberal policy.  
 Finally, the lack of meaningful participation is likely the biggest flaw in the legitimacy of 
the Zambian PRSPs. Imboela (1996) writes that one must question “to what extent Zambia 
‘owns its poverty-reduction programs when it constantly must answer to IFIs,” observing that “it 
should be recalled that poor countries have never successfully resisted IFIs’ global development 
programs” (437). Because the policies are predetermined even before participation and 
“awareness workshops” like the ones that took place in Zambia, “participation simply becomes 
an exercise that lends legitimacy and credibility to the PRSP process without challenging the 
underlying structural causes of poverty” (Imboela, 1996, 441).  
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This is, again, most clearly evidenced in the reliance on the agricultural sector to 
compensate for the Anglo-American mining corporation ending its activity in Zambia. The 
decision to prioritize an agricultural economy perpetuates a longer trend of emphasis on African 
countries as centers of raw material export, rather than looking at the impending decrease in the 
mining sector as an opportunity for Zambia to develop an industrial economy. Thus, the PRSP 
process, despite having adopted a poverty reduction focus and ‘increased participation 
measures,’ represents very little progress when it comes to fighting poverty in Zambia. 
Imboela also critiques the PRSP’s false promise of ‘participation,’ which, like in the case 
of Bolivia, is largely premised on decentralization measures and vaguely articulated “good 
governance objectives” (PRSP, 32). However, it is unlikely that decentralization is the key to the 
kind of good governance that would reduce poverty. When governance is decentralized, 
resources are more likely to be funneled directly from the national center to local elites with little 
oversight by the central government, rather than distributed equitably with attention paid to 
inequalities and marginalized groups. The impulse for good governance in the PRSP appears to 
be a more appealing package for the what are fundamentally the same policies as SAPs, rather 
than a desire for substantive reform. Desire to decentralize and possibly decrease corruption 
seems most closely linked to a push for foreign investment: “investors, particularly foreigners, 
are averse to bad governance, perceived or real” (PRSP, 42).  
 Whereas the initial promises of the 1983 and 1985 agreements were predicated on 
economic growth (performance legitimacy), the 2002 PRSP was centrally concerned with 
increasing popular participation and country ownership of economic policy (moral legitimacy). 
This shift—and the two policy interruptions in 1987 and 1991—show that there were legitimacy 
issues with the top-down operation of the initial policy. Even though the policies themselves did 
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not change significantly between 1985 and 2002, the way they were implemented—implying a 
higher level of concern for the average Zambian citizen and involvement in national concerns—
changed. Advertising the policy tools of moral legitimacy (participation, poverty reduction), in 





















Chapter 4 : Conclusion  
 
Legitimacy theory helps make sense of the policy transition from SAPs to PRSPs in both 
Zambia and Bolivia. However, as the literature on Gendered IPE shows, just using legitimacy 
theory to examine the shift in policy would fail to show the full picture. Rather, using 
frameworks from legitimacy theory together with insights from Gendered IPE gives a more 
complete history of the change in legitimation strategy. By understanding the operations of 
power in both the formal sphere: global governance, national policy, and the informal or 
unlabeled: gender, post-colonial, it becomes easier to understand the real consequences for 
legitimacy.  
Williams’ description of moral legitimacy and performance legitimacy offers a framework 
for understanding the transition from SAPs to PRSPs from the point of view of IFIs. When 
proving the legitimacy of IFI intervention with a growth-based, performance legitimacy failed, 
they switched to a moral legitimacy, norm-based, mode of legitimation for PRSPs.   
Steffek’s distinction between prescriptive and descriptive legitimacies, combined with Van 
Rooy’s writing on the “legitimacy game,” help understand how these policies played out in the 
countries where they were enacted, and whether this change in legitimacy model was successful. 
Considering how the shift from SAPs to PRSPs was received, in countries that experienced both, 
will reveal whether this new mode of legitimation was successful on a popular level.   
Some of the most important and most resonant critiques that SAPs and PRSPs have faced, 
beginning with “Adjustment with a Human Face,” have come from their failure to deal with 
gender. Feminist scholars like Elson (1994) and Benería (2003) have elaborated on and nuanced 
this criticism by considering the role PRSPs and SAPs have played in perpetuating existing 
oppressive power structures. When PRSPs have dealt with gender, it has been from Jenson’s 
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(2009) “social investment perspective,” meaning that the importance of alleviating poverty is 
phrased in the language of capital, and humanness-as-dollars. In addition to the most obvious 
flaws with this approach, such as that it neglects the needs of older women to “invest” in girls, 
who provide a bigger “return on investment,” it perpetuates the idea that the problems poor 
people do not need to be confronted holistically. The social investment perspective is highly 
unlikely to be able to address structural inequalities, power imbalances, and prejudices that 
perpetuated poverty in the first place.  
Critiquing how the legitimacy of structural adjustment and later, poverty reduction has 
operated is also, fundamentally, a critique of the idea that economic growth is inherently good. It 
is a critique of the idea of a growth-centric view of poverty reduction. IFIs shifting to PRSPs is 
not the same as alleviating poverty, or even as adopting policies that are actively engaged in 
ameliorating poverty. Programs like Conditional Cash Transfers, or programs geared toward 
social welfare more generally, would be more in line with alleviating capacity poverty: they 
would be more focused on improving both human capital and human security by helping people 
access the materials they need to achieve their potential. PRSPs are closer to SAPs in that they 
rely heavily on GDP growth to alleviate poverty—although there are more built-in social policy 
considerations, they are still premised on the idea that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats.’  
The most significant takeaway from a close reading of both the Bolivian and Zambian PRSPs 
is that they are little different from the Structural Adjustment strategy they were expected to 
replace. The differences are that PRSPs use social investment language, rather than classical 
economic language, to describe economic growth initiatives; and that PRSPs include “boxes” 
carved out for individual interest groups. Although gender is described as a “cross-cutting issue,” 
the writing about gender inside a “gender box.” The writing about community development is in 
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another box. Concerns about healthcare are in another box. Local unions or NGOs may get a 
box—or not.  
 Importantly, the compensatory programs enacted in both Bolivia and Zambia (the Fundo 
Emergencia Social, the Social Action Program, and others) perpetuated a growth-at-any-cost 
ideology of development, rather than challenged it. Although the programs were designed to 
provide services to the people who were suffering under the effects of structural adjustment, they 
represented an implicit acceptance that this kind of suffering was an inherent part of economic 
growth. The fact that the use of such compensatory programs persisted even after the 
implementation of PRSPs in both countries underscores the fact that PRSPs did not represent a 
significant shift in development policy. Even though PRSPs promised to reduce poverty, the 
continued use of compensatory employment and social programs showed that this rebranded 
economic policy was continuing to create a good deal of poverty.  
With that said, If IFIs were able to shift successfully to a norm-based model of legitimation, 
there are significant consequences not only for the international financial sector, but also for the 
fields of human rights and international law. If norms can be just as important, if not more 
important than performance, these two sectors which rely primarily on moral legitimacy for their 
survival will have a lesson to learn from the IMF and the World Bank.  
The PRSPs do represent some progress from the SAPs—but merely mentioning gender 
issues, issues of healthcare access, or education—that does not represent an integrated analysis 
of what affects people’s lives when IFIs come in “reduce poverty.” A more rigorously thoughtful 
development policy would not just include community concerns as add-ons, or mention that 
these groups had been “listened to.” Rather, it would integrate an analysis of obstacles to gender 
equity, to healthcare access, to education into a development plan. Further, it would see 
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development as more than just what can be monetized. Access to education and healthcare 
should not be described as investments or ways to develop human capital, but rather, ways to 
improve the lived experience of others. There is nothing inherently wrong with economic 
growth: but a development policy that makes a concerted effort not to refer to people as 
“capital,” to spread the benefits of development evenly, to include even the poorest of the poor—
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